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Dec. CHARLES H. BENTON, INc. v. PAINTERS UNION 677 
[45 C.2d 677; 291 P.2d 13] 
that under our law the purpose of the picketing here involved 
is not unlawful or that the court is applying the federal law 
only because interstate commerce is affected. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
Gibson. C. J ., and Traynor, J ., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22750. In Bank. Dec. 2, 1955.] 
CHARLES H. BENTON, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. PAINTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 333 et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Labor-Federal Boards-Jurisdiction.-Where an employer's 
business affects interstate commerce, in the first instance, 
jurisdiction of its controversy with labor unions vests ex-
clusively in the National Labor Relations Board. 
[2) Id.- Federal Boar1s- Jurisdiction.-Where an employer's 
petition for a determination of representation was dismissed 
by the National Labor Relations Board on the ground that 
the unions named in the petition did not claim to represent 
the unit of employees for which petitioner sought an election, 
this was not a refusal to take jurisdiction, but only a declara-
tion that petitioner was not entitled to an election under the 
provisions of the statute. 
[3] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-A general pro-
nouncement of the National Labor Relations Board that it will 
exercise jurisdiction only in cases in which the employer's 
business in interstate commerce exceeds a certain minimum 
amount is not sufficient automatically to confer jurisdiction 
on a state court where an employer's operations do not come 
up to that minimum. 
[4] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Courts.-In an action 
against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover damages, the 
state court has jurisdiction to award damages to the em-
ployer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them under 
state law. 
[1] See Am.Jur., Labor, § 145. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8] Labor, § 1a; [3, 4, 6, 7] Labor 
§ 24; [5, 9] Labor, § 20a; [10] Labor,§ 21. 
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[5] !d.-Unions-Economic Pressure Aetivities.-Independently of 
rights given under the federal statutes, under California de-
cisions an employer may not obtain relief from economic 
pressure asserted in an effort to compel him to sign a union 
shop agreement. 
[6] !d.-Remedies-Jurisdiction of State Oourts.-Although the 
state court may enforce rights given by federal statutes to 
the parties to a labor dispute through the traditional tort 
remedies of injunctioL and damages, it may not assume juris-
diction of the controversy unless the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has declined to act. 
[7] Id.-Remedies.-An employer may not obtain relief in a state 
court from the acts of unions in inducing a roofers' union to 
breach its contract by calling a strike, an activity which 
under California law unaffected by federal legislation is privi-
leged. (See Lab. Code, § 1126.) 
[8] !d.-Applicability of Federal Law.-Where an employer's 
roofing business does not affect interstate commerce, the fed-
eral law relating to labor-management controversies is not 
applicable. 
[9] !d.-Unions-Closed Shop.-A closed shop agreement is not 
invalid under California laws. 
[10] !d.-Strikes-Purpose of No-Strike Agreement.-The purpose 
of a no-strike agreement is industrial peace between the 
parties thereto, and its terms bind the employer not to lock 
out the employees for any reason and the union not to inter-
rupt the employer's business by labor difficulties; it is not 
restricted to disputes arising out of the contractual provisions 
for wages, hours and working conditions. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. John A. Hewicker, ,Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
Action against unions to enjoin picketing and to recover 
damages. Judgment for plaintiff reversed as to defendant 
truckers' and painters' unions and affirmed as to defendant 
roofers' union. 
P. H. McCarthy, Jr., F. Nason O'Hara and Herbert S . 
. Johnson for appellants Painters Local Union No. 333 and 
United Slate. Tile & Composition Roofer~ TJocal No. 45. 
Thomas Whelan for appellant Building Materials & Dump 
'rruck Drivers Local No. 36. 
Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye, James W. Archer and Ward W. 
Waddell, Jr., for Respondent. 
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EDMONDS, J .-The questions presented in this case are 
substantially the same as those decided in Garmon v. San 
Diego Bldg. Trades Counc£l, ante, p. 657 (291 P.2d 1). 
Here, as in the Garmon case, the appeal is from a judgment 
enjoining the unions from engaging in certain activities and 
a warding the employer damages. 
The findings of fact may be summarized as follows : 
Charles H. Benton, Inc., is a California corporation whose 
business is the mixing and selling of paint and paint supplies 
in interstate commerce. It is also engaged in the roofing 
business, but no express finding was made that this phase 
of the business did or did not affect interstate commerce. 
The painters' and truck drivers' unions advised the com-
pany that they intended to organize its employees in the 
paint business. Thereafter, on several occasions, they pre-
sented a proposed contract which included a provision that 
"the employer hereby agrees that the above listed Unions 
shall be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all em-
ployees. It is further agreed that new employees, not already 
members of the unions, shall, within thirty days, become and 
remain members of tl1e Union as a condition of continued 
employment." The company refused to enter into the con-
tract, asserting that it would be illegal for it to do so unless 
and until its employees had designated the unions as their 
collective bargaining representatives. It requested the unions 
to join with it in appropriate steps to ascertain if its em-
ployees desired such representation. After negotiations with 
union representatives, the employees refused to allow the 
unions to act for them. Neither union has been recognized 
by the National Labor Relations Board as the representative 
of the employees. 
The two unions then picketed plaintiff's place of business. 
'rhe picketing was intended to compel the employer "by 
means of pressure brought upon plaintiff's business through 
defendant" roofers' union and plaintiff's roofer employees 
''by the refusal" of thost> employees "to continue employ-
ment" while the pickt>ts were maintained and to compel the 
company to sign the offered contract "in the belief that if 
such a contract is executed and put into effect, the employees 
of the plaintiff will join, or be compelled to join, the defend-
ant Unions, and that no unfair labor practice charge will 
be filed with the National Labor Relations Board." The 
picketing was not intended to educate Benton's employees 
or to inform them of the benefits of unionization. 
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The roofers' union has caused roofer employees to refuse 
to work for the company, and has continued its strike, thereby 
disrupting the roofing business to the damage of the company. 
There is an existing contract between the roofers' union and 
the company with respect to the roofing employees and their 
wages, hours and working conditions. This contract pro-
vides: "The Employer shall call upon the Union for such 
men as he may from time to time need, and the Union shall 
furnish the Employer the required number of qualified and 
eompetent workmen needed by the Employer, qualifications 
and competency to be determined by the Employer. . .. '' 
By other provisions the union and the employer agreed "that 
there shall be no strikes or lockouts during the life of this 
Agreement and that any and all grievances or controversies 
which may arise with respect to the interpretation or appli-
cation shall be settled as hereinafter provided." Any dispute 
not settled by a conciliator, appointed by the parties, was to 
be referred to a conference board composed of equal repre-
sentatives of each party, with an additional number if neces-
sary. The roofers' union refused to follow this procedure 
in the present controversy. 
Upon these findings the court rendered a judgment which 
enjoins the unions from picketing the company's place of 
business, inducing employees to leave work or doing any other 
acts tending to injure the business in order to compel the 
company to execute the proffered contract until one of the 
two unions has been properly designated as the collective 
bargaining agent for the employees. The roofers' union is 
enjoined from "inducing any roofers employed by the plain-
tiff to refuse to work for the plaintiff, or from calling or 
inducing any work stoppage among the roofers employed by 
the plaintiff, or from refusing to make reasonable efforts to 
supply competent roofers to plaintiff upon request, so long 
as the contract between plaintiff and said defendant shall 
remain in effect, and requiring the said defendant to inform 
its members that they will not be discriminated against, fined, 
or otherwise disciplined for working for the plantiff." The 
judgment also awards damages of $2,243.78 against the 
defendants. 
As grounds for reversing the judgments the painters' and 
truck drivers' unions assert that the trial court lacked juris-
diction to enjoin their activities or to award damages against 
them, because a labor dispute in a business affecting interstate 
commerce is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the National 
Labor Relations Board. They contend also that they did 
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not violate the law of this state. The roofers' union claims 
that its contract with the is illegal under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, and therefore unenforceable by 
either party. But it also insists that it did not violate the 
collective that contract. 
The company argues that, regardless of federal law, the viola-
tion by the and truckers' unions of California stat-
utes vested courts with ;jurisdiction to enforce them. The 
judgment against the roofers' union is said to be justified 
because it breached the collective bargaining agreement. 
The facts as found by the trial court do not support the 
injunction against the painters' union and the truckers' 
union. [1] As the employer's paint business affects inter-
state commerce, in the first instance, jurisdiction of the con-
troversy with the unions vested exclusively in the National 
Labor Relations Board. (See Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. 
Trades Cmmcil, ante, p. 657 [291 P.2d 1]; Garner v. 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs &; Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 
U.S. 485 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228]; Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 [75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546].) 
[2] The employer's petition for a determination of repre-
sentation was dismissed by the board upon the ground that 
the unions named in the petition did not claim to represent 
the unit of employees for which the petitioner sought an 
election. This was not a refusal to take jurisdiction, but 
only a declaration that the petitioner was not entitled to an 
election under the provisions of the act. [3] The general 
pronouncement of the national board that it will exercise 
jurisdiction only in cases in which the company's business 
in interstate commerce exceeds a certain minimum amount 
is not sufficient to automatically confer jurisdiction on a state 
court where an employer's operations do not come up to that 
m1mmum. (l[innard Canst. Co. v. Building Trades Council, 
346 U.S. 933 [74 S.Ct. 373, 98 L.Ed. 423] .) 
[4] The state court has jurisdiction to award damages to 
the employer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them 
under state law. (United Canst. Workers v. Laburnum Canst. 
Corp., 347 U.S. 656 [74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025] .) [5] How-
ever, independently of rights given under the federal statutes, 
under California decisions an employer may not obtain relief 
from economic pressure asserted in an effort to compel him 
to sign a union shop agreement. [6] The federal statutes 
give the parties to a labor dispute rights in addition to those 
afforded by state law. Although the state court may enforce 
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those rights through the traditional tort remedies of injunc" 
tion and damages (Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council., ante, p. 657 [ 291 P .2d 1] ) , it may not assume 
jurisdiction of the controversy unless the National Labor 
Relations Board has declined to act. An employer in that 
situation is in much the same position as one who has failed 
to invoke his administrative remedies. ( Cf. Ge1·ry of Calif. 
v. Snperior Court, 32 Cal.2d 119, 129 [194 P.2d 689] .) 
[7] Similarly, the employer may not obtain relief from the 
acts of the unions in inducing the roofers' union to breach 
its contract, an activity which under California law unaffected 
by the federal legislation is privileged. (Imperial Ice Co. v. 
Rossier, 18 Cal.2d 33, 35 [112 P.2d 631].) 
The court found that the roofers' union breached its con-
tract by calling a strike of the roofing employees and inducing 
them to refuse to work for the employer in aid of the cam-
paign of the other two unions. Under the contract, the 
roofers' union agrees to furnish employees to Benton and 
''that there shall be no strikes or lockouts during the life 
of this Agreement and that any and all grievances or con-
troversies which may arise with respect to the interpretation 
or application shall be settled'' by arbitration. The employer 
covenants that employees shall not be discharged for "recog-
nizing authorized picket lines'' established by any affiliate 
of the American Federation of Labor. 
''Any collective bargaining agreement between an employer 
and a labor organization shall be enforceable at law or in 
equity, and a breach of such collective bargaining agreement 
by any party thereto shall be subject to the same remedies, in-
cluding injunctive relief, as are available on other contracts in 
the courts of this State.'' (I..~ab. Code, § 1126; see cases col-
lected 2 A.L.R.2d 1278.) 
[8, 9] The roofers' union argues that, because of its closed 
shop provision, the contract is illegal under the federal law 
and hence not enforceable. As to Benton's business, the 
court found: ''Plaintiff is . . . engaged in the business of 
mixing and selling paint and paint supplies; that during 
the year July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952, plaintiff made sales 
of its said products in the aggregate amount of approximately 
$178,910.10 directly in interstate and foreign commerce; with 
respect to the said business plaintiff is engaged in and its 
business affects interstate commerce. Plaintiff is and for 
several years has been also engaged in the roofing business 
in the City of San Diego and neighboring areas within the 
County of San Diego, State of California.'' It reasonably 
Dec.1955] CHARLES H. BENTON, INc. v. PAINTERS UNION 683 
[45 C.2d 677; 291 P.2d 131 
may be implied from this finding that Benton's roofing busi-
ness does not affect interstate commerce. The federal law, 
therefore, is not applicable, and a closed shop agreement is 
not invalid under California laws. 
[10] The roofers' union contends, however, that even if 
the agreement is enforceable, there has been no breach of it 
because the no-strike agreement pertains only to disputes 
arising out of the contractual provisions for wages, hours, 
and working conditions. The obvious purpose of the contract 
is industrial peace between the parties. Its terms, binding 
the employer not to lock out the employees for any reason 
and the union not to interrupt the employer's business by 
labor difficulties, refutes the union's claims as to its rights. 
The judgment as to the truckers' and painters' unions is 
reversed. As to the roofers' union it is affirmed. Each party 
shall bear its own costs on appeal. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in 
the conclusion reached by the majority but do not agree 
with the reasoning of the majority with respect to the power 
of a state court to enforce the provisions of the National 
Labor Management Relations Act as announced in Garmon v. 
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, ante, p. 657 [291 P.2d 1], 
and I adopt the views expressed in my dissent in the Garmon 
case on this proposition. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J ., concurred. 
